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I. INTRODUCTION
A deeply felt concern for the importance of refugee law, matched with
an equally ardent desire to secure its authority by exploring ways and means
that may keep it viable despite contemporary political and economic realities
that conspire to undermine it, constitutes the leitmotive in much of the work
of Professor James Hathaway. 1 His contribution to the symposium is no
exception, for it analyzes the source of perceived conceptual incoherences
which, if vanished, would contribute to safeguarding and renewing of the
capacity and preparedness of states to grant asylum to those who cannot
safely remain in states where they face the risk of being persecuted. 2
Hathaway's contribution focuses on the right of states to repatriate
former refugees and identifies the rules that govern the lawful exercise of
this right. Hathaway attributes the lack of a clear understanding of this right
and the applicable rules to acts and omissions on the part of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). To date, UNHCR has
not addressed the possibility and lawfulness of repatriation of former
refugees and it did not even do so when it elaborated the criteria that, if met,
would justify the cessation of refugee status by virtue of the cessation
clauses pertaining to changed circumstances in the country of origin.3
Hathaway considers the omission of UNHCR to link the loss of refugee
status by virtue of those cessation clauses to the possibility of repatriation of
the former refugee as "the source of tremendous conceptual incoherence in
* Dr. Marjoleine Y.A. Zieck is associate professor of public international law at the
Amsterdam Center for International Law and Director of the Amsterdam Law School of
the Faculty of Law of the University of Amsterdam
1 See, e.g., RECONCEIVING INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW (James C. Hathaway ed.,
1997), Marjoleine Zieck, Book Review, 5 INT'L J. ON MINORITY AND GROUP RTS. 433,
433-39 (1998).
2 James C. Hathaway, The Right of States to Repatriate Former Refugees, 20 OHIO
ST. J. Disp. REsOL. 175, 215-16 (2005).
3 See UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: Cessation of Refugee Status
under Article IC(5) and (6) of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
(the Ceased Circumstances Clauses), U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., U.N. Doc.
HCR/GIP/03/03 (2003) [hereinafter UNHCR, Guidelines].
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the refugee regime." 4 This omission is considered particularly striking when
held against UNHCR's emphatic norm-creating role with respect to volun-
tary repatriation, i.e., the standards it sets with respect to voluntary repatri-
ation and the corresponding leading role the agency not just assumes, but
requires. When implementing this solution in practice, this role eclipses any
other alternative, in particular the possibility of repatriating former
refugees.5
This response shall focus first on the subject UNHCR omitted to
address-the possibility of repatriation of former refugees and the norms
that govern this form of return. The assumption that the right of states to
repatriate former refugees may contribute to regenerating the asylum
capacity of states will be questioned. Second, it will discuss the concerns
that Hathaway addressed under the heading of "institutional overreaching,"
as exemplified by UNHCR's promotion of "its own" standards pertaining to
voluntary repatriation and cessation of refugee status. This practice of
UNHCR will be demonstrated to have a firm basis in international refugee
law, yet one which is itself prone to constituting a legal vanishing point.
States are portrayed by Hathaway as not only being largely in the dark with
respect to their legal entitlements regarding the return of former refugees,
but in addition as being put on the wrong foot by UNHCR's exercise of its
Statutory tasks such that the agency contributes to the concealing of the
authentic scope of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees
(hereinafter "1951 Convention") and sidelining the obligations it contains.
Rather than to UNHCR, this source of legal obfuscation should be attributed
to the peculiar systemic features of the refugee law regime itself,6 features
that are reflected and confirmed by states, notably those with a demonstrated
interest in and devotion to the solution of the refugee problem, in the
conclusions they adopt in the framework of the Executive Committee of
4 Hathaway, supra note 2, at 183.
5 On the requirement, see UNHCR, Handbook: Voluntary Repatriation: Inter-
national Protection, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., at 13 (1996).
6 The reference to "refugee law regime" should in the present context predominantly
be taken to refer to the Statute of the Office of UNHCR, G.A. Res. 428 (V), U.N. GAOR,
5th Sess., 325th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/Res/428 (1950) [hereinafter Statute of UNHCR], the
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28, 1951,
19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954) (as of Aug. 11,
2004, 142 states parties) [hereinafter 1951 Convention], and the 1967 Protocol relating to
the Status of Refugees, opened for signature January 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606




UNHCR. In short, the very real and serious negative protection conse-
quences alleged to follow from UNHCR's institutional overreaching will be
argued to have an altogether different cause.
I1. BEYOND THE REFUGEE LAW REGIME
A. The Limits of Special Regimes
Refugee law is a special and, in principle, temporarily applicable body
of international law that trumps the national laws that otherwise govern the
entry, stay, and departure of aliens with a view to secure the protection of
those who should have been protected by their respective countries of
origin. 7 It is an exceptional regime that only applies when required by the
exigencies, which are abstractly concentrated in the refugee definition. 8
Focusing on the 1951 Convention, the definition-also referred to as the
'inclusion clause' of the Convention-indicates to whom the Convention
applies, and the cessation clauses define when the Convention shall cease to
apply to them.9 When it ceases to apply, the laws and regulations that other-
wise govern the entry, stay, and departure of aliens apply once more. Indeed,
"[w]ithout the protection of refugee law, the individual concerned is in the
same position as any other non-citizen; he or she is subject to
removal...."10
The 1951 Convention does not indicate what laws apply with respect to
those who are its concern on the basis of its inclusion clause when the
Convention itself ceases to be applicable with respect to those persons. The
fact that it does not indicate such is not, however, an uncommon feature. To
the contrary, special temporary applicable rules of law that trump those that
apply in normal situations rarely, if ever, indicate what law applies when
they themselves cease to be applicable. The possibility of suspending the
observance of specified human rights, for instance, in the words of the 1966
Convention on Civil and Political Rights, when the life of the nation is
threatened by a public emergency'1 is not accompanied by the reminder that
this suspension gives way to the obligation to fully observe all the rights
7 Hathaway, supra note 2, at 177 (speaking of "surrogate international protection").
8 See 1951 Convention, supra note 6, at art. 1.
9 Id. at art. I(C).
10 Hathaway, supra note 2, at 178-79.
11 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec.
16, 1966, art. 4, 992 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
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enumerated in the Convention once the emergency is over. 12 This is self-
evident and need not be explained. The Geneva Conventions and Protocols
which govern the law relating to armed conflict, do not include provisions
stipulating that the law that applies in time of peace is applicable once again
when these instruments cease to be applicable. 13 It is conceivable that a
treaty that constitutes such a special regime would actually state the law that
applies-and subsequent applicable law would also need to be specified-
when it, itself, is no longer applicable. It is a moot point whether such an
explication would carry any legal weight beyond the temporal and
jurisdictional limits of the treaty's own applicability. It would rather consti-
tute a legally vain attempt to ruling from the other side of the grave. Conse-
quently, the fact that a special regime does not indicate what the law is
beyond its own reach does not create a conceptual void, 14 but most likely
avoids confusion and legal insecurity.
UNHCR's Statute governs the work of the agency with regard to the
same exceptional circumstances as in the 1951 Convention, and shares the
exceptional nature of the 1951 Convention in the sense indicated. UNHCR is
charged with providing international protection and seeking durable
solutions to the problem of refugees-tasks that indicate UNHCR is
supposed to focus on refugees rather than others. 15 The fact that UNHCR's
mandate ratione personae has been extended throughout the years does not
affect this inference in any relevant way, for its mandate with respect to
12 Cf Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 5, Derogation of
Rights (Art. 4), U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., (1981) and Human Rights Committee, General
Comment No. 29, States of Emergency (Art. 4), U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/2 1/Rev. 1/Add. 11 (2001). Neither one of these contain any such reminder.
13 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316 (entered
into force Oct. 21, 1950); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of Condition of
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114 (entered
into force Oct. 21, 1950); Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950); Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civil Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3516 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950); Protocol Added to the Geneva
Convention of Aug. 12, 1949, art. 18, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec.
7, 1978); Protocol Added to the Geneva Convention of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 609 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978).
14 This void is implied by Hathaway, supra note 2, at 183.




those of its concern ceases too on the basis of cessation clauses. 16
Leaving aside the fact that UNHCR has actually hinted at the possibility
of return of former refugees, 17 reproaching UNHCR for the omission to take
it up in a structural way, thereby causing the alleged conceptual incoherence
in the refugee law regime, would only be justified if this omission could be
viewed as contrary to its Statutory tasks, such as, considering Hathaway's
concern, promoting the admission of refugees to the territories of states. 18 If
the repatriation of former refugees is considered to contribute to regenerating
the asylum capacity of states, a causal link is thereby suggested between the
right to repatriate former refugees and the admission of ("new") refugees.
There are no compelling arguments that substantiate the existence of such a
causal link, as will be set out in Part ll.D infra. In the absence of such a link,
there is no legal argument that justifies holding UNHCR accountable for the
pertinent omission. 19
B. The Fifth and Sixth Cessation Clauses
Obviously, the criticism of the omission to address the repatriation of
former refugees would hit the mark if the fifth and sixth cessation clauses in
any way address the question of repatriation of former refugees. If so,
Hathaway's call for a "Convention-based understanding of repatriation"
would be fully justified. This section will explore the meaning of the
pertinent cessation clauses. It will do so to the limited extent necessary to
identify the temporal limits of the 1951 Convention as a special regime in
the sense indicated earlier.
The text of the two clauses in the 1951 Convention runs as follows:
This Convention shall cease to apply to any person which falls under
16 Note, though, that UNHCR claims to retain a role with respect to those persons
who lost their refugee status as a result of the fifth and sixth cessation clauses "for a
period of grace." UNHCR, Guidelines, supra note 3, at para. 25 (viii). For the text of the
fifth and sixth cessation clauses, see infra Part ll.B.
17 The fact that cessation of refugee status may bring about the return of the person
concerned, which in turn may entail breaking ties, social networks, and employment in
the country of asylum, induced UNHCR cautions against a premature or insufficiently
grounded application of the cessation clauses. Id. at para. 7.
18 Statute of UNHCR, supra note 6, at para. 8 (d).
19 With regard to the charge that UNHCR's silence on the possibility of repatriation
of former refugees facilitates return of refugees, alternatively a premature loss of refugee
status, see infra Part ll.D.
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the terms of its inclusion clauses if:
(5) He can no longer, because the circumstances in connection with
which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to
refuse to avail himself of the protection of the country of his nationality;
Provided that this paragraph shall not apply to a refugee falling under
section A(1) of this Article who is able to invoke compelling reasons arising
out of previous persecution for refusing to avail himself of the protection of
the country of nationality;
(6) Being a person who has no nationality he is,' because the
circumstances in connection with which he has been recognized as a refugee
have ceased to exist, able to return to the country of his former habitual
residence; Provided that this paragraph shall not apply to a refugee falling
under section A(1) of this article who is able to invoke compelling reasons
arising out of previous persecution for refusing to return to the country of
his former habitual residence.20
Central to both clauses, ultimately, is the restoration or availability of
protection. The availability of protection is singled out in UNHCR's
Guidelines on Cessation 2' and repeated by Hathaway, disregarding the
difference in ,wording between the two cessation clauses, even though the
sixth one appears to hint at actual return. 22 The fifth clause is confined to
reavailment of protection whilst the sixth one refers to the ability to return. It
20 The initial drafts of what would eventually become the 1951 Convention did not
include these two clauses. France suggested amending the text of the draft convention
(i.e., the version contained in U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., app. II,
U.N. Doc. A/1385 (1950)) by adding the following new paragraph to that part of the
definition that identified those to whom the convention would not apply: "The
circumstances in connexion [sic] with which he has been recognized as a refugee have
ceased to exist and he can no longer claim valid grounds for continuing to refuse to avail
himself of the protection of the government of the country of his nationality." U.N.
GAOR 3d Comm., U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., U.N. Doc. AIC.3/L.123 (1950). On November
29, 1950, an informal working group was formed to take this and other amendments
relating to the definition into consideration. On December 1, 1950, this working group
presented revised joint compromise amendments (U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., U.N. GAOR,
5th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/C.3/L.131/Rev.1 (1950)), which were subsequently discussed by
the Third Committee of the General Assembly, in particular at its 332d session. The dis-
cussion, however, did not include consideration of the cessation clauses pertaining to
changed circumstances. See U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 5th Sess., 332d mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/SR.332 (1950).
21 UNHCR, Guidelines, supra note 3, at 4.
22 See Hathaway, supra note 2, at 184, 185, 188-91.
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is submitted that the reference to the ability to return in the sixth clause
should be taken as the functional equivalent of the protection mentioned in
the fifth one as a circumscription that has solely been induced by the lack of
nationality of this category of refugees. "Return" is, moreover, used in an
active sense, which corroborates this submission, rather than in a passive
one, which would signify the possibility of mandatory return. The difference
in wording would, consequently, seem to be irrelevant in the present context:
The cessation clauses define the moment the country of asylum may cease to
extend its protection on the basis of the 1951 Convention.
The delegate of France, in the debates held by the Conference of
Plenipotentiaries charged with adopting the text of the 1951 Convention,
observed that, "it]here was no reason, for example, why France should
continue to shoulder the burden of certain refugees, when that burden
naturally devolved upon the government of the country of which they were
nationals." 23 However, this observation should be read with an emphasis on
"refugees," for the same delegate also pointed out that, "if an immigrant was
deprived of his refugee status, that would not compel him to return to his
country of origin." 24 The delegate of Israel "agreed that to withdraw the
status of refugee need not have serious consequences for the refugee in
question, because he would still be protected by the national laws of his
country of refuge . "...-25 When the same delegate drew attention to the
somewhat contradictory nature of the French observations, the French
delegate replied that "France had merely said that she did not wish to be
23 U.N. GAOR Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and
Stateless Persons, 28th mtg. at 12, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.28 (1951) [hereinafter
Conference, 28th mtg.]. Note that Hathaway, supra note 2, at 185, refers to observations
made by the same delegate, but to press home a different point, to wit, the intention of
the drafters of the 1951 Convention that only a fundamental change of circumstances in
the country of origin would justify cessation of refugee status.
24 Conference, 28th mtg., supra note 23, at 11. "Immigrant" should be taken to refer
to "refugee" and "deprived" to cessation of refugee status. See id. France also referred to
the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization (IRO) to point out that it had
actually required return with respect to Spanish refugees when a democratic regime has
been restored in Spain. Id. at 14-15.
25 Id. at 12. "Withdraw" should be taken to mean cessation of refugee status. See id.
This conclusion has fairly recently been repeated in comparable terms by Joan
Fitzpatrick, Current Issues in Cessation of Protection Under Article 1 C of the 1951
Convention and Article 1.4 of the 1969 OAU Convention (June 1, 2001), at para. 10
(background paper for an expert roundtable on cessation as part of UNHCR's Global
Consultations and available at the UNHCR website, http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/global-consultations).
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under an obligation to continue to provide assistance to refugees who could
seek the protection of their country of origin."' 26 In short, the possibility of
cessation of refugee status solely indicates when the obligation of states
parties to extend protection on the basis of the 1951 Convention comes to an
end.
C. The Law Relating to Former Refugees
The logical corollary of legal regimes that only apply in specified
situations is that the rules that apply after they cease to be applicable have to
be sought outside those regimes. The 1951 Convention defines in the
cessation clauses when the Convention ceases to apply to those it previously
did on the basis of its inclusion clause, that is, the refugee definition. As set
out in the preceding section, the cessation clauses define when refugee
protection is no longer needed: "Article 1C of the 1951 Convention literally
applies only to the formal termination of previously granted refugee
status."27 Consequently, the fate of those who have ceased to be refugees in
virtue of the cessation clauses is regulated by other (international) law than
the 1951 Convention and cannot, therefore, be "Convention-based. '28 The
question is what law regulates the fate of these people, a question that has
been addressed by Hathaway in terms of the constraints on lawful repatri-
ation.
The constraints identified by Hathaway are distilled from a critical
analysis of the norms that are part of the composite standard of "safety and
dignity." Paradoxically enough for this composite is the shorthand
designation of the substantive norms that have been developed and are
promoted by UNHCR to govern the voluntary repatriation of refugees and
their subsequent reintegration as returnees in the country of origin.29 The
26 Conference, 28th mtg., supra note 23, at 14.
27 Fitzpatrick, supra note 25, at para. 3. Put differently, the observation of Hathaway
that the right of state parties to undertake mandated repatriation follows quite directly
from satisfaction of the criteria for cessation on the basis of the fifth and sixth cessation
clauses is unaffected; only the implication that this right would in any way be based on
the 1951 Convention is challenged. Hathaway, supra note 2, at 191.
28 Hathaway, supra note 2, at 191-92.
29 The Executive Committee confined itself to recommending states deal humanely
with the consequences of cessation for the affected individuals or groups and that
countries of asylum and countries of origin should together facilitate the return to assure
that it takes place in a fair and dignified manner. UNHCR, Executive Committee
Conclusion No. 69 (XLm), Cessation of Status, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., at (f) (1992).
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contention that the safety and dignity standard overstates the real obligations
of governments effectuating the mandatory return of former refugees 30 is
consequently tantamount to countering a straw man position since the
pertinent obligations are part of the solution of voluntary repatriation of
refugees as a durable solution.31 The "only" norms that are identified by
Hathaway as governing mandatory repatriation of former refugees are sum-
marized as the "rights to security of person; to be free from cruel, inhuman,
or degrading treatment; and not to be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful in-
ference with his or her family life,"'32 which in particular signifies that return
will be suspended to allow, for instance, the recovery of those who are ill
and to complete a school term for those who have minor schoolgoing
children. 33
All Executive Committee Conclusions are available at the UNHCR Executive
Committee's website, http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/excom. With respect to the
return of asylum seekers and persons not in need of international protection, the
Executive Committee calls for returns in a humane manner with respect for their human
rights: as far as could be ascertained, the mode of return of these persons has twice been
qualified by reference to "safety and dignity." See UNHCR, Executive Committee
Conclusion No. 79 (XLVII), General Conclusion on International Protection, U.N.
GAOR, 51st Sess., at (u) (1996); UNHCR, Executive Committee Conclusion No. 81
(XLVIII), General Conclusion on International Protection, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., at (s)
(1997). In view of the fact that later conclusions do not repeat this qualification, which is
part and parcel of the solution of voluntary repatriation of refugees, its use with respect to
others rather than refugees is most likely just an oversight. See, e.g., UNHCR, Executive
Committee Conclusion No. 85 (XLIX), Conclusion on International Protection, U.N.
GAOR, 53d Sess., at (bb) (1998); UNHCR, Executive Committee Conclusion No. 96
(LIV), Conclusion on the Return of Persons Found Not to be in Need of International
Protection, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., at (c) (2003).
30 Hathaway, supra note 2, at 211.
31 See Marjoleine Y.A. Zieck, Voluntary Repatriation: Paradigm, Pitfalls, Progress,
23 REFUGEE SURV. Q., Oct. 2004, at 33, 37.
32 Hathaway, supra note 2, at 191, 207, 209, 210, 216. Those rights are identified as
corresponding with article 6, article 7, paragraph 1, article 9, paragraph 1, article 10, and
article 17 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note
11; article 10, paragraph 1, article 11, article 12, and article 13, paragraph 2(a) of the
1966 Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) (Hathaway mentions article 23 and
article 24 also, but it is not clear why); and articles 2, 8, 9, and 10 of the 1989 Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, G.A. Res. 44/25,
U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 48, at 166, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 (1989) (entered
into force Sept. 2, 1990).
33 See, e.g., Hathaway, supra note 2, at 214.
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It is submitted the identified norms do not exhaust those which are
applicable, since the enumeration is confined to the norms that govern actual
return as if cessation is "a device to trigger automatic return," which it is
not.34 Preceding actual return, there are other legal constraints that are part
and parcel of the right of states to repatriate aliens, a right that is usually
referred to in terms of expulsion and deportation. In fact, "repatriation" is a
misnomer, for the right to expel aliens does not necessarily include the right
to decide the country of destination. 35 The legal constraints involved may
partly be inferred from the wording of several provisions. At the universal
level, Article 13 of the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides
that:
An alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to the present
Covenant may be expelled therefrom only in pursuance of a decision
reached in accordance with law and shall, except where compelling reasons
of national security otherwise require, be allowed to submit the reasons
against his expulsion and to have his case reviewed by, and be represented
for the purpose before, the competent authority or a person or persons
especially designated by the competent authority. 36
Note that this Article applies to any obligatory departure of an alien
regardless of whether it is described in national law as expulsion or
otherwise. 37
The main regional human rights treaties contain similar provisions. In its
Article 22, paragraph 6, the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights
provides that, "An alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to this
Convention may be expelled from it only pursuant to a decision reached in
accordance with law." 38 Under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the 1981 African
Charter on Human Rights and Peoples' Rights, "A non-national legally
admitted in a territory of a State Party to the present Charter, may only be
expelled from it by virtue of a decision taken in accordance with the law."'39
34 Fitzpatrick, supra note 25, at para. 10.
3 5 MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR
CoMMENTARY 228 (1993).
36 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 11, at art. 13.
37 Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 15, The Position of
Aliens under the Covenant, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., at para. 9 (1986).
38 1969 American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature Nov. 22,
1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force July 18, 1978).
39 African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples' Rights, opened for signature July
[Vol. 20:1 20051
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Similarly, in Article 1, paragraph 1 of the Seventh Protocol (1984) to the
1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms:
An alien lawfully resident in the territory of a State shall not be
expelled therefrom except in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance
with law and shall be allowed:
a. to submit reasons against his expulsion,
b. to have his case reviewed, and
c. to be represented for these purposes before the competent authority
or a person or persons designated by that authority. 40
In most of the quoted provisions-discussion is possible about the legal
significance of the difference between the qualifications of 'lawfully
resident' and 'legally admitted'-the procedural rights are predicated on
lawful stay. With respect to the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Nowak observed that, "An alien's residency is lawful when he or she has
entered the State of residence in accordance with its legal system (not
necessarily a law in the formal sense) and/or is in possession of a valid
residency permit .... "41 With respect to states parties to the 1951
Convention, the evaluation of the legality of residence of refugees is to be
determined by taking the relevant provisions of the 1951 Convention into
consideration, in particular Article 31 thereof.42 Moreover, when the legality
of stay is disputed in a given case, the Human Rights Committee is of the
view that the procedural guarantees of Article 13 are nevertheless to be
applied. 43
. With respect to refugees who have been admitted as such, the legality of
27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1992) (entered into force Oct.
21, 1986).
40 Protocol No. 7 to the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 22, 1984, 24 I.L.M. 435,
E.T.S. No. 117, at 2 (entered into force Nov. 1, 1988). Note that the concept of expulsion
is used in a generic sense in this provision as meaning any measure compelling the
departure of an alien from the territory. Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 7, para. 10.
Article 1, paragraph 2 allows expulsion before the exercise of the rights listed in
paragraph 1 when required in the interests of public order or on. account of national
security.
41 NOWAK, supra note 35, at 224.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 225; Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 15, supra
note 37, at para. 9.
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residence in relation to entry is obviously not an issue; those refugees can be
qualified to be lawful residents. Yet, when the cessation clauses have been
invoked, the former refugee cannot anymore be considered an alien who is
lawfully a resident. This would entail that the safeguards the procedural re-
quirements constitute with respect to expulsion do not apply with regard to
those former refugees. However, in view of the fact that those former
refugees entered the state of residence in accordance with its legal system,44
they would nevertheless be entitled to the safeguards indicated.
In short, his lawful residency in the sense indicated entitles the former
refugee to a decision regarding his expulsion in accordance with the law, and
to the various procedural rights enumerated in the quoted provisions, such as
a hearing, appeal to a higher instance, the right to be informed of the rem-
edies, and the right to be represented. 45 The Human Rights Committee made
it clear, moreover, that the requirement of a decision which is taken in
accordance with the law goes beyond the procedural guarantees that are
listed in Article 13 and authorizes to review the substantive requirements of
the law to be applied. 46 Thus, preceding actual departure (perhaps return),
there are other legal constraints than those that have been identified by
Hathaway which form part of the right of states to expel aliens. In particular,
there are constraints that allow the prospective expellee to put forward any
claim, such as those based on acquired rights, to remain in the country
following his loss of refugee status.
This particular claim is not accommodated by the procedural
requirements regarding the application of the cessation clauses of the 1951
Convention; those clauses, and the reference will throughout be to the fifth
and sixth cessation clauses, solely focus on cessation of refugee status. They
assume that refugee status is no longer warranted, and the burden of proof
rests on the refugee to refute that particular conclusion. He can only do so by
demonstrating he still qualifies as a refugee in terms of the definition
included in the 1951 Convention, and he may not invoke any other rights
unless the state concerned allows an appeal to traumatic experiences arising
44 See the above-quoted explanation of the meaning of lawful residence in NOWAK,
supra note 35, at 224.
45 Note that the procedural requirements that are included in article 13 are based on
article 32 of the 1951 Convention. MARC J. BOssuYT, GUIDE TO THE "TRAVAUX
PRtPARATOIRES" OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
269 (1987).
46 NOWAK, supra note 35, at 226 (making reference to the 1979 case of Marafidou
v. Sweden); see also Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 15, supra
note 37, at para. 10.
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from past persecution. 47 If, though, cessation is coupled with the possibility
of expulsion, considerations that bar expulsion will be evaluated, including,
in particular, an assessment of any claim with respect to continued stay. 48 In
addition, those considerations will have to include international human rights
obligations in order to ascertain that the former refugee will not be exposed,
following expulsion, to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. 49
D. Regeneration of Asylum Capacity
Implicit throughout Hathaway's article is the assumption that a clear
understanding of the possibility of repatriation of former refugees may create
the physical and mental space to (re)generate the asylum capacity and
preparedness on the part of states.50 The legal constraints governing
expulsion, however, do not have this regenerating effect.
First of all, reference should be made to the hesitant, even reluctant, if at
all existing, practice of states with regard to invoking the fifth and sixth ces-
sation clauses. This reluctance may be explained by past practice that
induced granting asylum on an indefinite basis in conjunction with
provisions in the 1951 Convention which favor integration in the country of
asylum (by means of naturalization or the grant of another durable legal
status), a practice which invited the qualification of the 1951 Convention as
demonstrating an exilic bias.51 Even if the considerations that caused this
47 But see Hathaway's criticism of UNHCR's attempt to construe this exception as a
legally binding one. Hathaway, supra note 2, at 204-06. For a different analysis, see
Fitzpatrick, supra note 25, at paras. 69-70, 75. See also David Milner, Exemption from
Cessation of Refugee Status in the Second Sentence of Article 1C(5)/(6) of the 1951
Refugee Convention, 16 INT'L J. OF REFUGEE L. 91 (2004). The Netherlands can be
mentioned as a state party to the 1951 Convention that allows invoking this exception.
4 8 See infra Part II.D, 14-15.
49 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 11, at art. 7;
1950 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for
signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, E.T.S. No. 5, art. 3 (entered into force Sept. 3,
1953); 1969 American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 38, at art. 22, par. 6.
50 Hathaway makes this point explicitly in the conclusion. See Hathaway, supra note
2, at 215. For a similar view, see Michael Barutciski, Involuntary Repatriation When
Protection is No Longer Necessary: Moving Forward after the 48th Session of the
Executive Committee, 10 INT'L J. OF REFUGEE L. 236, 242, 254 (1998).
51 This particular qualification was made by Hathaway. See James C. Hathaway, A
Reconsideration of the Underlying Premise of Refugee Law, 31 HARV. INT'L L.J. 129,
160, 183 (1990).
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legal bias have ceased to apply, the legally relevant fact remains that the
1951 Convention still includes a number of provisions that enable and favor
integration in the country of asylum. 52 Second, what has been qualified as a
'renewed interest in cessation' has not so far resulted in an increase in
formal termination of refugee status.53 Apart from the exilic bias of the 1951
Convention, the actual integration of refugees in the country of asylum may
account for this, an integration which may entitle one to prolonged stay upon
cessation as the logical corollary of acquired rights. 54 Moreover, the pro-
cedural issues involved, as exacting as those which apply to processing
asylum claims, 55 in themselves already constitute a prohibitive bar. The
procedural requirements concerning expulsion hinted at in the preceding
section only enlarge the procedural burden involved. Practice regarding
those constraints, with respect to asylum seekers whose claims have been
rejected and who seek to prevent expulsion by invoking these rights by
relying on those constraints, have congested courts and created huge
procedural expenses. 56
52 Fitzpatrick accordingly observes that "reconciling Article IC to Articles 12-30
poses dilemmas for asylum states and for UNHCR." Fitzpatrick, supra note 25, at para.
35.
53 Id. at para. 4. With respect to the feasibility of involuntary return, a number of
arguments, including the probability that safe conditions may independently induce
return, are adduced, which combine "to deprioritize this type of control measure." Id. at
para. 85.
54 See infra note 58 and accompanying text. These considerations may account for
the reason the Executive Committee and UNHCR have not included former refugees in
their considerations pertaining to the return of persons not in need of international
protection. See infra note 66.
55 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 25, at paras. 50, 51, 63, 66, 105; Joan Fitzpatrick &
Rafael Bonoan, Cessation of Refugee Protection, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNHCR's GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTEC-
TION 491, 515 (Erika Feller et al. eds., 2003).
56 See Matthew J. Gibney & Randall Hansen, Deportation and the Liberal State: The
Forcible Return of Asylum Seekers and Unlawful Immigrants in Canada, Germany and
the United Kingdom 2, 10-11 (Feb. 2003) (UNHCR New Issues in Refugee Research
Working Paper No. 77, available at UNHCR's website, http://www.unhcr.ch) (discussing
the reluctance or inability of states to invoke deportation on account of the rights-based
constraints bounding deportation). On the ineffectivity of deportation, see id. at 7. On
backlogs (in general), see Justice Department to Reduce Number of Judges Hearing Im-
migration Appeals, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 7, 2002, available at LEXIS, News
Library, Allnws File (describing backlogs in the USA); Phillip Johnston, Refugees are
Playing the System, Says Judge, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Apr. 10, 2003, available at
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Some aspects of those procedural constraints should be mentioned to
illustrate the point made. The procedural constraints invariably refer to a
decision which has been taken in accordance with the law. 57 The law will
usually prescribe entitlements on the basis of length of legal stay in the
country concerned, 58 a tangible basis that is usually and loosely referred to
in terms of "acquired rights."59 The existence of such rights renders the
assumption that cessation necessarily leads to repatriation, 60 as if cessation
is indeed a device that triggers automatic return (or expulsion) moot. A
decision to cease refugee status will consequently often give way to another
status that entitles the person concerned to continue stay in the country,
particularly when the refugee can invoke the fact of prolonged legal stay.61
LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File (describing backlogs in the UK); on congested courts,
see Associated Press, [Australian] Courts Choked by Illegal Immigrants' Appeals to
Deportation, Aug. 27, 2001 (illustrating also the procedural costs involved-an
application for review costs an average of $5,350, and $10.7 million were spent on
applications in 2000-2001).
57 1969 American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 38, at art. 22(6);
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, supra note 39, at art. 12(4); Protocol No.
7, supra note 40, at art. 1(1).
58 Turk and Nicholson refer to the state practice of granting long-term residence
status to those whose long stay in the host state has resulted in strong family, social, and
economic ties. Volker TUrk & Frances Nicholson, Refugee Protection in International
Law: An Overall Perspective, in REFUGEE PROTECTION, supra note 55, at 3, 32. More-
over, "[i]f an alien has developed such a close relationship to his or her State of residence
that it has become his (her) 'home country,' s(he) is entitled, in addition to Article 13, to
the nearly unrestricted protection against expulsion under Art. 12(4)." NOWAK, supra
note 35, at 224-25 (making reference to the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights). For more, see Walter Kalin who, with reference to two views of the Human
Rights Committee (Stewart v. Canada (1996) and Giosu Canepa v. Canada (1997)),
maintains that, "What must be decisive in the context of Article 12(4) ICCPR is... that
the link between the immigrant and the country of immigration has become so intensive
that the country of origin is now the point of reference in his or her life." Walter Kahn,
Limits to Expulsion under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in
DmrI DELL'UoMo, EsTRADIZIoNE ED ESPULSION; ATTI DEL CONVEGNO DI STUDIO
ORGANIZATO DALL'UNIVERSITA DI FERRARA PER SALUTARE GIOVANNI BATTAGLINI 143,
151 (Francesco Salerno ed., 2003).
59 See UNHCR, Executive Committee Conclusion No. 69, supra note 29, at (e).
60 Hathaway speaks of the "obvious linkage between satisfaction of the test for
cessation of status under Article IC (5-6) and the right of state parties mandatorily to
repatriate former refugees to their country of origin." Hathaway, supra note 2, at 183; see
also supra note 25.
61 Cf. UNHCR, Guidelines, supra note 3, at para. 3. In the Netherlands, asylum
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Comparable legal constraints operate with respect to substantial refugee
populations. For those states that host large refugee populations (various
African states hosting Angolan refugees may be mentioned here), "repat-
riation of former refugees" would in theory constitute a means that would
literally create space for granting other refugees asylum in those states.
Assuming that circumstances in Angola would justify the cessation of
refugee status on the basis of the fifth and sixth cessation clauses, the sheer
number of former refugees involved would bar their expulsion. All three
regional human rights treaties are very clear on this point.62 First, Article 22,
paragraph 9 of the American Convention stipulates that "[t]he collective
expulsion of aliens is prohibited." 63 Similarly, Article 12, paragraph 5 of the
1981 African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples' Rights stipulates that
"[t]he mass expulsion of non-nationals shall be prohibited. Mass expulsion
shall be that which is aimed at national, racial, ethnic or religious groups." 64
Likewise, Article 4 of the Fourth Protocol (1963) to the 1950 European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
says "[c]ollective expulsion of aliens is prohibited. ' '65 These provisions do
not constitute an absolute bar to expulsion, but they do mean that each
individual should be considered separately.
In view of those constraints, expulsion of former refugees will in
seekers considered to qualify as refugees in the sense of the 1951 Convention will be
granted asylum for the duration of three years. During those three years, the fifth and
sixth cessation clauses may be invoked as appropriate; after those three years have
expired, asylum will be granted for an indefinite period of time and the fifth and sixth
cessation clauses can no longer be invoked. See ALDO KUIER &J.D.M. STEENBERGEN,
NEDERLANDS VREEMDELNGENRECHT, 134-35, 369-70 (2002). Effective as of September
1, 2004, asylum will not anymore be granted for three years, but instead for five years.
62 Article 13 of the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights should be
understood as leading to a similar result. NOWAK, supra note 35, at 226; Human Rights
Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 15, supra note 37, at para. 10 (noting that
article 13 entitles each alien to a decision in his own case). Note that the announcement
of France that it ended the practice of deportation of groups of illegal immigrants by
chartered flight to their home countries was welcomed by the Human Rights Committee
in 1997. Gregor Noll, Rejected Asylum Seekers: The Problem of Return, 25-26 (May
1999) (UNHCR New Issues in Refugee Research Working Paper No. 4, available at
UNHCR's website).
63 1969 American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 38.
64 African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples' Rights, supra note 39.
65 Protocol No. 4 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and




practice either be rare or, alternatively, violate the prohibition of collective
expulsion. Either scenario is unlikely to engender regenerated asylum
preparedness. Consequently, UNHCR's failure to address the repatriation of
former refugees does not contravene its Statutory obligation to promote the
admission of refugees to the territories of states.
The desire to enhance the asylum capacity and preparedness on the part
of states may rather be realized by ensuring that those who do not qualify as
refugees are expelled. The inability to effect the expulsion of those who do
not qualify for refugee status or legal stay on humanitarian grounds
adversely affects the institution of asylum. 66 For instance, Britain is not
capable of deporting more than ten percent of unsuccessful asylum seekers,
and thus many of them have a good chance of remaining in Britain. 67 With
respect to those who can eventually be expelled, the costs involved are
almost prohibitive, both financially and politically.68 Conscious of the fact
66 UNHCR and the Executive Committee recognize the adverse effect of the
inability to expel those who do not qualify for refugee or any other status on the
institution of asylum. See, e.g., UNHCR, Executive Committee Conclusion No. 96, supra
note 29, at preamble and (b); UNHCR, Executive Committee Conclusion No. 71 (XLIV),
General Conclusion on International Protection, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., at (j) (1993);
UNHCR, Executive Committee Conclusion No. 74 (XLV), General Conclusion on
International Protection, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., at (j) (1994); UNHCR Standing
Committee, Return of Persons Not in Need of Protection, U.N. ESCOR, 3d mtg. at para.
18, U.N. Doc. EC/46/SC/CRP.36 (1997) available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/excom; UNHCR Standing Committee, Return of Persons Not in Need of
Protection, 8th mtg., U.N. ESCOR, at paras. 13-16, U.N. Doc. EC/47/SC/CRP.28
(1997). None of those documents refer to the return of former refugees, which is
indicative of the observation that their return is not viewed as something that would
contribute to creating asylum space in any sense. Press clippings also illustrate the
negative effects of the inability to expel rejected asylum seekers on the institution of
asylum. See, e.g., Paul Waugh, Home Office Plans Huge Rise in Deportations, THE
INDEPENDENT, Feb. 14, 2001 available at LEXIS, News Library, Indpnt File; Ireland and
Bulgaria Sign Pact on Illegal Immigrants, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Jan. 31, 2002
available at 2002 WL 2329700 (referring to the numbers of asylum seekers straining
social and housing services); Associated Press, UK: Government to Press Ahead with
Tough Curbs on Asylum-Seekers, June 11, 2002; Johnston, supra note 56.
67 CTK News Agency, Britain Not to Give Advance Notice of Asylum Seekers'
Deportations, BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING: INTERNATIONAL REPORTS-EUROPEAN
STORIES, Sept. 24, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library, Bbcmir File.
68 In addition to the procedural expenses involved, referred to earlier, reference can
be made to the costs of actual implementation of deportation orders, including
apprehension of the prospective expellees and the logistical problems and costs in
enforcing return, e.g., chartering flights and the political costs involved. See Gibney &
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that failure to solve it boils down to undermining the whole idea of rules
which govern the entry and stay of aliens, various attempts have been made
to solve this problem. 69 Those attempts include alternatives to expulsion
and/or deportation, such as offering free flights home,70 repatriation
premiums, 71 and institutionalizing deterrents, including rapid or fast-track
deportation within one or two days if the application is "clearly un-
founded,"'72 and the establishment of removal or deportation centers, 73 set-
ting deportation targets (essentially an exercise in wishful thinking), 74 and
concluding bilateral return or readmissions agreements (also referred to as
"deportation deals") in order to facilitate and ensure the deportation of failed
asylum seekers (to overcome such problems as the lack of the requisite
documentation pertaining to identity and nationality that is required in order
to obtain travel documents from the country of origin).75 The second means
Hansen, supra note 56, at 11-12.
69 Id. at 14 ("The nation-state has not lost control over entry to its borders; it has
rather lost control over movement within and from its borders." (emphasis original)).
70 New Irish Scheme Offers Asylum Seekers Free Flights Home, AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, Nov. 20, 2001, available at 2001 WL 25067243.
71 Voorstel Verdonk: Verdubbeling vertrekpremie asielzoekers, NRC
HANDELSBLAD, June 21, 2004; Europa ontdekt vrijwillig terugkeerbeleid, NRC
HANDELSBLAD, Aug. 10, 2004; Geen vrijwillige terugkeer zonder enige dwang, NRC
HANDELSBLAD, Aug. 10, 2004.
72 UK: Government to Press Ahead, supra note 66; Norway: Fast-Track
Deportation for Asylum Seekers, INFOPROD, Dec. 19, 2002, available at LEXIS, News
Library, Allnws File.
73 Waugh, supra note 66 (doubling the size of the detention estate); Andy Kelly et
al., UK: Airport Security Fears Over 'Removal Centre', DAILY POST, Feb. 15, 2002,
available at LEXIS, News Library, Dlypst File; UK: Tougher Measures for Rejected Asy-
lum Seekers Announced, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESS, Feb. 25, 2002, available at 2002 WL
2348630; Anthony Deutsch, Netherlands Opens First 'Deportation Centre' for Im-
migrants, CANADA PRESS, June 27, 2003, available at 2003 WL 58530817; Eerste
vertrekcentrum asielzoekers in Ter Apel, NRC HANDELSBLAD, June 8, 2004.
74 The apparently popular practice of setting deportation targets in the United
Kingdom is explained by Gibney and Hansen as an obsession with numbers that is a par-
ticular feature of British deportation policy. Gibney & Hansen, supra note 56, at 8.
75 Note in that respect that an estimated 80% of those who seek asylum in the
Netherlands do not carry any documents regarding their identity and nationality. On
concluding return agreements, see Ireland to Sign Deportation Deals with Poland and
Bulgaria, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Jan. 25, 2001, available at 2001 WL 2328226;
Ireland and Bulgaria Sign Pact, supra note 66; Verdonk wil hulp China bij terugkeer,
NRC HANDELSBLAD, June 1, 2004 (describing the travel of the Netherlands' Secretary of
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to renew asylum capacity consists of the promotion of voluntary repatriation
of those who qualify as refugees (viewed in terms of the constraints that
qualify the right of states to expel aliens including former refugees, it comes
as no surprise that the international community of states hails this particular
solution as the ideal one). UNHCR clearly concentrates on this solution. The
extent to which it does has invited the criticism of institutional overreaching.
111. INSTITUTIONAL OVERREACHING
A. Prominence of UNHCR
The charge of institutional overreaching is predominantly based on two
interrelated perceptions: UNHCR's de facto dominance in voluntary
repatriation practice and UNHCR's actions which promote states' deference
to UNHCR's voluntary repatriation practice. It is submitted that the practice
of institutional overreaching as indicated follows from the allocation of
protection responsibilities from which the refugee law regime proceeds. 76
When UNHCR was created and the text of its Statute was drafted, the
question of the responsibilities that would become those of the new agency
was explicitly addressed. It was taken up in order to closely circumscribe the
nature of the new agency, particularly to ensure it would not become an
operational agency, as had been its direct predecessor, the International
Refugee Organization (IRO), a pre-eminently operational agency with a
broad mandate and matching resources. 77 In the new, post-war set-up, the
primary responsibility for the protection of refugees would rest with states,
and UNHCR's role would essentially be complementary to that of states
(and non-operational at that).78 The nexus between UNHCR's role and the
State to China with a view to cutting a deportation deal).
76 On the meaning of the designation "refugee law regime," see supra note 6.
77 On the International Refugee Organization, see LOUISE W. HOLBoRN, THE
INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ORGANIZATION: A SPECIALIZED AGENCY OF THE UNITED
NATIONS, ITS HISTORY AND WORK 1946-1952 (1956).
78 Instructive for the "working of the new system" is the illustration made by France
with reference to two hypothetical cases. U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 4th Sess., 263d mtg., at
para. 11, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.263 (1949). See also U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., France:
Draft Resolution, U.N GAOR, 4th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/529 (1949); U.N.
GAOR 3d Comm., France: Draft Resolution, U.N GAOR, 4th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/L.26 (1949); U.N. GAOR, 3d Comm., 4th Sess., 256th mtg., at paras. 14, 15, U.N.
Doc. A/C.3/SR.256 (1949); U.N. GAOR, 3d Comm., 4th Sess., 256th mtg., at para. 39,
U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.256 (1949) (Belgium); U.N. GAOR, 3d Comm., 4th Sess., 257th
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obligations of states was secured by means of a treaty obligation to
cooperate with UNHCR.
When the drafting of the 1951 Convention was completed, however, it
was obvious that the implied closed circuit of a continuum of obligations of
states on the one hand and complementary ones on the part of UNHCR on
the other, which would, in principle, end simultaneously, was only partly
realized. The common hinge in the form of a uniform definition was lacking.
The envisaged continuum failed to materialize in that respect, only to
become more visible and problematic in the years to come with the extension
of UNHCR's mandate ratione personae that was not matched by a similar
one on the part of states parties to the universal refugee instruments.
Besides the understanding that UNHCR's role was to be complementary
to that of states, 79 UNHCR was given specific tasks and entrusted with
distinct responsibilities-including the search for durable solutions to the
problem of refugees among which voluntary repatriation figures
prominently 8 0-that, albeit still qualifiable as complementary to that what
states are legally obliged to do, also requires distinctive undertakings on the
part of UNHCR. The distinctness of the search for the solution of voluntary
repatriation is reinforced by the fact that the 1951 Convention does not refer
at all to the possibility of voluntary repatriation, at least not in terms of
solutions (for it could be argued that the fourth cessation clause is predicated
mtg., at para. 32, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.257 (1949) (United Kingdom); U.N. GAOR, 3d
Comm., 4th Sess., 258th mtg., at para. 68, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.258 (1949) (France);
U.N. GAOR, 3d Comm., 4th Sess., 262d mtg., at para. 12, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.262
(1949) (France: "The High Commissioner's main task would be to negotiate with
Governments in order to persuade them to grant legal protection to the refugees on their
territories. He could not himself provide that protection .... ); U.N. GAOR, 3d Comm.,
4th Sess., 263d mtg., at para. 7, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.263 (1949) (France); U.N. GAOR,
5th Sess., 329th plen. mtg., at para. 54, U.N. Doc. A/PV.329 (1950) (France).
79 Obviously, this complementarity only applies in the sense indicated with regard to
states who are parties to the relevant instruments. In those instances where UNHCR was
called upon to act in cooperation with states not parties to any of the relevant
instruments-nowadays still a reality-its role of necessity became more prominent. See
UNHCR, Executive Committee Conclusion No. 4 (XXVII), International Instruments,
U.N. GAOR, 32d Sess., at (d) (1977) (reaffirming the fundamental importance of
UNHCR's Statute in respect to such states).
80 In that respect, it should be noted that the language of solutions is one that
belongs to the realm of refugee law strictu sensu and does not apply to solving such




on voluntary repatriation). 81 As a result, it fell on UNHCR to develop this
Statutory task, albeit within the legal confines of the refugee law regime. 82 It
could thereby rely on the cooperation it could expect from states by virtue of
provisions to that effect comprised in Article 35 of the 1951 Convention,83
and Article 2 of the 1967 Protocol as will be set out in the next section.
Consequently, institutional overreaching on the part of UNHCR appears to
be required as a matter of legal principle.
In view of its Statutory tasks and distinct responsibilities, it is not more
than reasonable that UNHCR also assumes the overall coordination and
implementation of voluntary repatriation on the basis of the norms it was
supposed to develop (and which have been sanctioned by its Executive
Committee), 84 particularly also considering the fact that voluntary
repatriation is a cross-border event which involves more than one, and
usually more than two, states. Part of UNHCR's complementary tasks
consists in that regard of ensuring that the responsibilities on the part of the
81 See Hathaway, supra note 2, at 175-76. With respect to the observation that
voluntary repatriation is in no sense a substitute for satisfaction of the true legal
requirements set by the Convention with regard to cessation, see id. at 182. However,
voluntary repatriation has never aspired to constitute a substitute in the sense indicated.
See Zieck, supra note 31 (describing the relation between the cessation clauses and
voluntary repatriation, and providing a brief analysis of the protection this solution
entails for the refugees concerned).
82 "Within" those confines, in other words, the norms which have been developed
by UNHCR with regard to voluntary repatriation on the basis of its Statutory task to
engage in this very solution (using the leeway of Article 35, paragraph I of the 1951
Convention) cannot, as is implied by Hathaway, supra note 2, at 182, 192-93, be con-
sidered as if they constitute an essentially autonomous and extraneous normative
framework that is imposed onto the 1951 Convention. Moreover, voluntary repatriation
often, and preferably so, takes place on the basis of so-called special agreements (a
designation which follows from Article 8 (b) of the Statute of UNHCR), which require
the consent to be bound on the part of states.
83 Grahl-Madsen suggests that Article 35 gives effect to the obligation to cooperate
with the United Nations in the field of human rights as comprised in Article 56 of the
Charter of the United Nations: "This brings the observance of the material provisions of
the [1951] Convention within the orbit of the vested interests of the United Nations."
Atle Grahl-Madsen, Commentary on the Refugee Convention 1951 Articles 2-11, 13-37,
at 149 (1963) (republished by UNHCR's Division of International Protection in 1997).
84 The key conclusions are UNHCR, Executive Committee Conclusion No. 18
(XXXI), Voluntary Repatriation, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess. (1980) and UNHCR, Executive
Committee Conclusion No. 40 (XXXVI), Voluntary Repatriation, U.N. GAOR, 40th
Sess., (1985), which are reaffirmed in UNHCR, Executive Committee Conclusion No.
74, supra note 66, at (y).
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states concerned are allocated and implemented. 85
B. The Bermuda Triangle of the 1951 Convention: Article 35,
Paragraph 1
Article 35, paragraph 1 constitutes the legal linchpin of what has been
qualified by Hathaway as institutional overreaching. Although this
institutional overreaching can be explained as resting on a firm legal basis,86
the negative purport of the charge made should now be addressed. It is sub-
mitted that Article 35, paragraph 1 itself allows, and consequently may
invite, this negative charge on account of the fact that it comprises all the
features which allow it to function as the legal equivalent of the Bermuda
Triangle-that is, a vanishing point. Article 35, paragraph 1 is a blanket
norm in that it may comprise anything UNHCR sets out to do, an in-
definiteness which is reinforced and 'enlarged when UNHCR broaches
subjects that are not, or not directly, addressed by the 1951 Convention.
Article 35, paragraph 1 provides that:
The Contracting States undertake to co-operate with the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, or any other agency of the
United Nations which may succeed it, in the exercise of its functions, and
shall in particular facilitate its duty of supervising the application of the
provisions of this Convention. 87
85 See Zieck, supra note 31, at 40.
86 The Executive Committee has on various occasions reminded states of their
obligation to cooperate with UNHCR. See UNHCR, Executive Committee Conclusion
No. 52 (XXXIX), International Solidarity and Refugee Protection, U.N. GAOR, 43d
Sess., at (1) (1988); UNHCR, Executive Committee Conclusion No. 57 (XL),
Implementation of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess. (1989); UNHCR, Executive Committee Conclusion
No. 74, supra note 66, at (e); and UNHCR, Executive Committee Conclusion No. 79,
supra note 29, at (f). States parties to the 1951 Convention recalled their obligations to
cooperate with UNHCR in the exercise of its functions and urged states to ensure closer
cooperation between states parties and UNHCR to facilitate UNHCR's duty of
supervising the application of the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol in the 2001
Declaration of States Parties. Declaration of States Parties to the 1951 Convention and/or
its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Dec. 13, 2001, operative paragraphs
8 and 9, U.N. Doc. HCR/MMSP/2001/09 (2001).
87 See also 1951 Convention, supra note 6, at Preamble ("Noting that the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is charged with the task of supervising
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The reference to UNHCR's "exercise of its functions" should be taken
as an indefinite one: "As Article 35 does not limit itself to functions laid
down in some international instruments it is clear that it obliges the
Contracting States to co-operate in any and all of the functions of the High
Commissioner's Office, irrespective of their legal basis."88 The unfettered
potential of the obligation to cooperate with UNHCR may also be inferred
from the following observation that was made by the delegate of Belgium
when the 1951 Convention was drafted:
The Belgium Government keenly desired the High Commissioner's col-
laboration in the execution of the Convention. In its opinion there was, in
the present instance, no question of an international organization interfering
in the exercise by Contracting States of their prerogatives, but only of a
guarantee afforded to the refugees covered by the Convention. Although the
need for such a guarantee might not often be felt, it was none the less true,
as the Belgian delegation had already pointed out, that the authorities of the
country of reception would be at the same time both judge and party in
every appeal submitted by a refugee and in every request concerning the
exercise of a right by a refugee. Article 30 [currently 35] gave refugees
moral satisfaction in that it amounted to the setting up of the "refugees'
government" to which they had long aspired. 89
In short, Article 35 combines a specific obligation on the part of states
parties to the Convention with an almost carte blanche for UNHCR. The
conjunction of specificity and indeterminateness in Article 35, paragraph 1
can be considered to constitute a systemic feature that may ultimately
account for some of the negative protection consequences to which
Hathaway refers. 90
international conventions providing for the protection of refugees, and recognizing that
the effective co-ordination of measures taken to deal with this problem will depend upon
the co-operation of States with the High Commissioner."). The reference to a successor
agency has become redundant, since the interval existence of UNHCR-its mandate
required quinquennial prolongation-was in 2003 exchanged for an indefinite one, that
is, "until the refugee problem is solved." See G.A. Res. 58/153, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess.,
Supp. No. 49, at para. 9, U.N. Doc. A/Res/58/153 (2003).
88 Grahl-Madsen, supra note 83, at 151 (emphasis added). Note that this may entail
cooperation with regard to persons who fall within the mandate ratione personae of
UNHCR, but outside the scope of the inclusion clause of the 1951 Convention.
89 U.N. GAOR Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and
Stateless Persons, 27th mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.27 (1951).
90 The reference is to the alleged (Convention-blind) deference of states to
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Obviously, Article 35 entitles UNHCR to require the cooperation of
states in the exercise of its functions, which explicitly includes the
supervision of the application of the 1951 Convention. This supervisory task,
which is jealously guarded by UNHCR,91 is taken to include extensive
exercises in interpretation, i.e., interpretation that is "intended to provide
legal interpretative guidance for governments. '92 A classic example of this
long-standing-and generally accepted-practice is UNHCR's Handbook on
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951
Convention and the 1967 Protocol, which was first issued in 1979 in
response to a request to that effect of UNHCR's Executive Committee.93 A
more recent example is the set of guidelines UNHCR issued pertaining to the
cessation of refugee status on the basis of Article 1C(5) and (6) of the 1951
Convention which complement the Handbook on Procedures and Criteria.94
The legal justification for issuing those guidelines is stated by UNHCR to
consist of its Statute/mandate in conjunction with Article 35 of the
UNHCR's voluntary repatriation practice, which is identified as the cause of practices,
such as their seizing a UNHCR-organized voluntary repatriation movement as sufficient
imprimatur to either prematurely cease the refugee status of the refugees originating from
the same state or to simply send them back. Cf. Hathaway, supra note 2, at 193, 198, 199,
202-03.
91 For example, the first of the summary conclusions on supervisory responsibility
drafted by UNHCR following the roundtable held in Cambridge in July 2001 as part of
UNHCR's Global Consultations says, "Generally, there was agreement that the iden-
tification of appropriate mechanisms should seek to preserve, even strengthen, the pre-
eminence and authority of the voice of the High Commissioner. Anything that could
undermine UNHCR's current Article 35 supervisory authority should be avoided."
Summary Conclusions: Supervisory Responsibility Expert Roundtable, Cambridge, July
2001, in REFUGEE PROTECTION, supra note 55, at 667-68.
92 UNHCR, Guidelines, supra note 3, at 1.
93 UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status
under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees,
U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/Rev.1 (1992) (revising the 1979
version). In the Agenda for Protection, UNHCR is requested to produce complementary
guidelines to this Handbook-guidelines that should draw on applicable international
legal standards, state practice, jurisprudence, and doctrine (in particular also the inputs
from the expert roundtables which were organized as part of the Global Consultations).
See UNHCR, Report of the Fifty-Third Session of the Executive Committee of the High
Commissioner's Programme, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., Annex IV, at point 6 of the
programme of action, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/973 (2002).




Convention and Article .2 of the 1967 Protocol.95 In other words, UNHCR
draws on the deference of states, which it considers to follow from the
obligation of states to cooperate with it, particularly with respect to its
Statutory task of supervising the 1951 Convention.
The "serious confusion between the standards which govern the work of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees-as an international
agency-and those which circumscribe the sovereign authority of states
parties to the Refugee Convention" 96 may consequently largely be explained
by the nature of the obligation of states under the 1951 Convention and 1967
Protocol to cooperate with UNHCR, which comprises of facilitating its duty
of supervising the application of the 1951 Convention. The allocation of
tasks and responsibilities within the refugee law regime including the
linkage between them that is provided by Article 35, paragraph 1 (and its
equivalents) are in addition reflected (and confirmed) in a matching form of
institutional overreaching for which states themselves are responsible as will
be set out in section Il.D.
C. Limits To Article 35: Checks And Balances
Article 35, paragraph 1 calls for cooperation with UNHCR in the
exercise of its functions, which includes supervision of the application of the
1951 Convention. The question that follows naturally considering the
blanket nature of Article 35, paragraph 1 pertains to the limits to the
obligation of states to cooperate with UNHCR on the basis of this provision.
With respect to supervision, the agency has long considered its
supervisory role as including interpretation of the Convention. 97 It could be
argued that supervision includes guaranteeing that the Convention is applied
in a substantially similar manner in comparable situations. In order to do so,
a yardstick is obviously necessary. This yardstick naturally consists of the
95 Article 2, paragraph 1 of the 1967 Protocol states as follows:
The States Parties to the present Protocol undertake to co-operate with the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, or any other agency
of the United Nations which may succeed it, in the exercise of its functions, and
shall in particular facilitate its duty of supervising the application of the provisions
of the present Protocol.
1967 Protocol, supra note 6, at art. 2, para. 1. This section and the next section will focus
on Article 35, paragraph 1, but the findings apply mutatis mutandis to Article 2,
paragraph 1.
96 Hathaway, supra note 2, at 215.
97 See supra Part 11I.B.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
text of the 1951 Convention itself. However, the text may not always be
sufficiently clear. Moreover, since it dates from 1951, it may need to be
adapted to modem needs, convictions, and legal developments. 98 The need
for such a yardstick immediately demonstrates the awkwardness of
UNHCR's supervisory task. UNHCR is fully entitled to identify what it con-
siders to be the yardstick it will apply in its exercise of the Statutory task of
supervision, yet interpretation of the 1951 Convention beyond the accepted
canons of interpretation-a rather elastic one can be found in two Vienna
Conventions pertaining to the law of treaties99-may well be considered to
fall outside the supervisory function of UNHCR and squarely within the
power of states parties to the 1951 Convention, hence exceeding the scope of
the obligation to cooperate with the agency on the basis of Article 35. There
is no easy solution to the balancing act required here. The fact that UNHCR
touches on, if not infringes, the prerogative of states parties to interpret the
obligations they have incurred under the 1951 Convention may well explain,
though, why states do not consider themselves legally bound to observe the
98 This contention would not seem to be too far-fetched; reference could be made to
the practice (and in particular the need which induced it) of issuing general comments by
the Human Rights Committee and the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights with respect to the provisions of the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and the 1966 Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, respectively. Whereas
the former instrument contains a provision (Article 40, paragraph 4) that allows such
general comments, the latter does not. On the legal basis and practice of the Human
Rights Committee to issue general comments, see HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CoNTEXT: LAW, POLrTICS, MORALS 731-32 (2d ed.
2000). In that respect, it is worth adding that states are requested to provide UNHCR with
information about the implementation of the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol on the
basis of questionnaires; UNHCR and states were requested by the Executive Committee
to work together to strengthen implementation including through harmonized application
of the refugee definition criteria. UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion No. 68
(XLIII), General Conclusion on International Protection, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess.
(1992). But see Walter Kalin, Supervising the 1951 Convention on the Status of
Refugees: Article 35 and Beyond, 2001, at para. 18 (background paper for the second
expert roundtable in Cambridge as part of UNHCR's Global Consultations) (describing
the somewhat disappointing practice of this information gathering), para. 7 (describing
the primary purpose of Article 35, paragraph 1 of the 1951 Convention (and Article 2 of
the 1967 Protocol) of achieving "an optimal implementation and harmonized application
of all the provisions of the Convention and its Protocol").
• 99 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, at arts. 31-32,
1115 U.N.T.S. 331, 340; The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States
and International Organizations or Between International Organizations, Mar. 21, 1986,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 129/15 (1986).
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procedures and criteria set out by UNHCR in its handbook.100
Beyond the specific task of supervising the application of the 1951
Convention, UNHCR may call and expect the cooperation of states with
respect to the exercise of its own functions, including in particular those
identified earlier as distinct ones, e.g., its active search for durable solutions
including the norms that it, true to its mandate, develops in order to be able
to implement those solutions.' 0' This cooperation on which UNHCR may
rely is subject to two forms of limitation. First of all, it should be recalled
that UNHCR's overall tasks were meant to be complementary to those of
states. In that respect, the agency has a subsidiary, rather than a primary, role
to play. However, when it comes to such distinct tasks which demand a more
extensive (and primary) role on the part of UNHCR, such as with respect to
voluntary repatriation, a second limitation should be emphasized-the
obligations of states under the 1951 Convention. 10 2 Any overreaching in this
respect may be checked by entering the various obligations states have under
the 1951 Convention, of which Article 35, paragraph 1 is but one, into the
equation. Put differently, the juxtaposition of the obligation to cooperate
with UNHCR to the various other obligations comprised in the 1951
Convention needs to be emphasized. Nonetheless, UNHCR cannot be
reproached for state practice in violation of treaty obligations; neither the
fact that states seize a UNHCR-organized voluntary repatriation movement
to engage in the return of refugees originating from the same state nor do so
to cease the refugee status of those refugees can be attributed to UNHCR
either directly or indirectly. 103
100 See Kalin, supra note 98, at 9-10 (concluding that such UNHCR positions on
matters of law are authoritative, but not legally binding).
101 Any such norms are, however, developed in close cooperation with states and
scholars. See, e.g., UNHCR, Information Note on the Development of UNHCR's
Guidelines on the Protection Aspects of Voluntary Repatriation, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. EC/SCP/80 (1993).
102 This point is repeatedly made by Hathaway. See, e.g., Hathaway, supra note 2, at
202 (referencing the fact that, "It is states parties which are held to account under the
Refugee Convention, and their accountability is strictly a function of compliance with
their formal treaty obligations").
103 Hathaway implies this throughout. See, e.g., Hathaway, supra note 2, at 193,
198, 199, 202-03, 206, 215 (contending indirectly that UNHCR has facilitated ducking
the stringent obligations of the 1951 Convention by failing to articulate the difference
between its institutional role in voluntary repatriation and the possibility of mandatory
repatriation following the application of the fifth and sixth cessation clauses).
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D. The Contribution of States
UNHCR is criticized for acts and omissions which are ultimately
considered to cause a conflation of norms, affecting what is referred to as the
authentic scope of the 1951 Convention by sidelining obligations comprised
in the 1951 Convention. The mandate of UNHCR, as laid down in its
Statute, in conjunction with Article 35, paragraph 1 of the 1951 Convention
goes a long way towards explaining the legal confusion that has been iden-
tified by Hathaway, exculpating UNHCR along the way.
In addition to this systemic cause, it would seem that states themselves
have contributed to this confusion by drawing on the systemic features of the
refugee law regime and proceeding from the institutional prominence
UNHCR enjoys within that regime on the basis of its Statute and Article 35,
paragraph 1.
For instance, it would seem that states, rather than UNHCR, are
responsible for the prominence that has been given to the solution of
voluntary repatriation. This prominence is not, however, surprising-the
refugee law regime only knows two solutions: voluntary repatriation and
reintegration (which may take place in the country of asylum or elsewhere
upon resettlement). Resettlement of refugees is, to put it mildly, problematic:
in that respect, the last major resettlement, that of Indo-Chinese refugees,
proved only possible when the countries of refuge engaged in what cannot be
qualified other than in terms of blackmail. 10 4 In practice, the sparsely
available resettlement places are used for the most destitute cases for which
no other option is available. 10 5 It is consequently only pursued as a last
resort. Integration in the country of refuge will take place more often but,
again, is not an option in those instances where a state hosts a substantial
refugee population. In short, reality dictates the preference for the solution of
voluntary repatriation. States have expressed this preference time and again,
both in the General Assembly, the parent organ of UNHCR, and the
Executive Committee, a subsidiary organ of the Economic and Social
104 See, e.g., Arthur C. Helton, Asylum and Refugee Protection in Thailand, 1 INT'L
J. REFUGEE L. 20, 24-25 (1989); see also MARJOLEINE Y.A. ZIECK, UNHCR AND
VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION OF REFUGEES: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 226, 463 (1997).
105 In 2003, 26,000 refugees were resettled. Only 16 states have agreed to annual
resettlement quota. Note that the resettlement figure for 2003 differs in this report. See
Meeting on Refugee Resettlement Opens in Geneva, UNHCR News Stories, June 15,
2004, available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/news; see also UNHCR
Standing Committee, Progress Report on Resettlement, U.N. ESCOR, 30th mtg. at para.
32, U.N. Doc. EC/54/SC/CRP. 10 (2004).
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Council (ECOSOC), the other principal United Nations organ charged with
supervising UNHCR.10 6
The Statute of UNHCR foresees the establishment by the ECOSOC of
an advisory committee. 10 7 The initial reason the Statute envisaged the
creation of such a committee was to secure the cooperation of states which
are not members of the United Nations. '0 8 This rationale for its existence has
lapsed by now, in view of the fact that most states are members of the
organization. It may explain, though, why this body has always been
composed of states rather than independent experts. The remaining reason
for this composition consists of the consideration that interested states, often
the states directly affected by refugee crises, should be represented on this
body.' 09 This composition probably induced Hathaway's observation that
the Executive Committee "symbolically reaffirms the commitment of states
to refugee law and provides democratic legitimacy" to the work of
UNHCR. 110
The function of the body now known as the Executive Committee of the
Programme of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees" I was
106 See Statute of UNHCR, supra note 6, at art. 1 (stating that the High
Commissioner is "acting under the authority of the General Assembly"), art. 3 ("The
High Commissioner shall follow policy directives given him by the General Assembly or
the Economic and Social Council."), art. 11 ("The High Commissioner shall report
annually to the General Assembly through the Economic and Social Council.").
107 Id. at art. 4.
108 Cf. G.A. Res. 319 (V), at 36, U.N. Doc. A/Res/319 A(IV) (1949); see also U.N.
GAOR 3d Comm., 5th Sess., 335th mtg., at para. 19, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.335 (1950)
(USA). A very different consideration was formulated by the delegate of France: "The
advisory council would have a wholesome effect in that it would prevent the High
Commissioner from becoming a virtual dictator over the refugees between sessions [of
the General Assembly and the ECOSOC]." U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 5th Sess., 334th
mtg., at para. 32, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.334 (1950).
109 See Statute of UNHCR, supra note 6, at art. 4; E.S.C. Res. 672, U.N. ESCOR,
25th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 5, U.N. Doc. E/Res/672 (1958). In addition, this composition
ensures a structural form of liaison with the donor states among them; note in that respect
the functions and authority of the Executive Committee with respect to the allocation and
use of funds by UNHCR. Id. at art. 2.
10 James C. Hathaway, Who Should Watch over Refugee Law?, FORCED
MIGRATION REv., July 2002, at 23-24.
111 The current Executive Committee was established in 1958; it succeeded the
UNREF (United Nations Refugee Fund Executive Committee) (1955-1958), which had,
in turn, succeeded the UNHCR Advisory Committee on Refugees (1951-1955). See
E.S.C. Res. 672, supra note 109, at 5 (establishing the Executive Committee); E.S.C.
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to act, at the request of the High Commissioner, as an advisory body to
UNHCR with respect to the exercise of its functions.' 12 Although its advice
was not binding to the High Commissioner, the General Assembly has
changed the status of that advice into UNHCR-binding directives. However,
the Executive Committee does not confine itself to giving advice to UNHCR
but also addresses states. 113 Regardless of the legal status of its addresses
and calls on states,11 4 these should not be ignored in view of their function
within the refugee law regime. However, unlike UNHCR's standard-setting
with respect to its functions and securing the cooperation of states thereby
which is firmly rooted in law, the practice of the Executive Committee to
address itself to states in its conclusions does not find a basis in law.
The conclusions of the Executive Committee have greatly contributed to
the institutional prominence of UNHCR. By way of illustration, reference
can be made to the conclusions it adopted regarding the solution of voluntary
repatriation: UNHCR was given the right of initiative and full involvement
not only with respect to the logistics of voluntary repatriation but also with
respect to its substance by allowing UNHCR to become a party to voluntary
repatriation agreements by giving the agency the responsibility of creating
the conditions conducive to return, an extended mandate, and so forth. 115
Res. 565, U.N. ESCOR, 19th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 2-3, U.N. Doc. E/Res/565 (1955)
(establishing the UNREF Executive Committee); E.S.C. Res.. 393, U.N. ESCOR, 13th
Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 49-50, U.N. Doc. E/Res/393 (1951) (establishing the Advisory
Committee on Refugees).
112 For the terms of reference, see G.A. Res. 1166, U.N. GAOR, 12th Sess., Supp.
No. 18, at 19, U.N Doc. A/Res/1 166 (1957) and E.S.C. Res. 672, supra note 109.
113 In addition, the Executive Committee urged states to heed its conclusions; this
"[s]tresses the importance of the role played by this Committee in providing guidance
and forging consensus on vital protection policies and practices, and, in this connection,
emphasizes the need for due regard to be paid to the Conclusions of the Executive
Committee." UNHCR, Executive Committee Conclusion No. 81, supra note 29, at (g).
114 See Jerzy Sztucki, The Conclusions on the International Protection of Refugees
Adopted by the Executive Committee of the UNHCR Programme, 1 INT'L J. OF REFUGEE
L. 285,303 (1989).
115 See UNHCR, Executive Committee Conclusion No. 18, supra note 84; UNHCR,
Executive Committee Conclusion No. 40, supra note 84; UNHCR, Executive Committee
Conclusion No. 74, supra note 66, at (y) (reaffirming both Conclusion No. 18 and
Conclusion No. 40) (stating that this "underscores the leading role of UNHCR in
promoting, facilitating, and coordinating voluntary repatriation of refugees, in
cooperation with States concerned, including ensuring that international protection con-
tinues to be extended to those in need until such time as they can return in safety and




Another example that relates to UNHCR's task of supervising the
application of the 1951 Convention is the conclusion the Executive
Committee adopted with respect to cessation of protection. 116 In this
conclusion, the Committee suggests that a decision on cessation on the part
of UNHCR may be useful to states in connection with the application of the
cessation clauses in the 1951 Convention. 117 In addition, the Committee in-
dicates, with explicit reference to the supervisory task of UNHCR laid down
in Article 35, paragraph 1, that UNHCR should be appropriately involved in
the application of the cessation clauses, which nevertheless exclusively rests
with the contracting states themselves.
Even a cursory glance at the many conclusions the Executive Committee
has adopted throughout the years indicates that the Committee draws on the
original allocation of responsibilities within the refugee law regime,
including the obligation of states to cooperate with UNHCR. At the same
time, though, it cannot be maintained that the Executive Committee loses
sight of the obligations and corresponding responsibilities of states parties to
the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol. Having said this, the serious
negative protection consequences identified by Hathaway, such as the
recurrent practice of states seizing a UNHCR-organized voluntary
repatriation movement as a trigger to either cease refugee status or return
refugees originating from the same country of origin, call for more
specificity on the part of the Executive Committee. With respect to voluntary
repatriation, for instance, much confusion would be eliminated if the dis-
tinction between the criteria that govern voluntary repatriation and those
which justify cessation of refugee status would be elaborated in a
conclusion, and the same holds true for the composite "safety and
dignity." 118 More specificity on the part of the Executive Committee could
repatriating refugees and monitoring their safety and well-being upon return").
116 UNHCR, Executive Committee Conclusion No. 69, supra note 29.
117 The stated utility may be explained by the fact that the nature of the refugee law
regime entails that refugees are not only the concern of a particular host state, but
simultaneously of UNHCR. This, in turn, favors simultaneous action with regard to
cessation, considering the problems that may ensue when the host state invokes these
clauses before UNHCR is prepared to do so with respect to a particular group of
refugees. In view of this, the decision of the government of Zambia to defer repatriation
of Rwandan refugees "until the United Nations signs a cessation clause to strip them of
their status" should be welcomed. The Times of Zambia, Zambia:'Rwandan Refugees
Can't Be Forced Out'-Government, AFRICA NEWS, Mar. 4, 2003, available at LEXIS,
News Library, Allnws FILE.
118 See Zieck, supra note 31, at paras. 3.1, 3.3.
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also serve to clarify the relation between UNHCR's supervisory role with
respect to the 1951 Convention and the responsibility of states to implement
this Convention.119
119 The following issue, which was raised by Professor Fitzpatrick, is illustrative of
the specificity that would be required: "Executive Conclusion No. 69 (XLH) and the
Guidelines [on the application of the cessation clauses dating from 1999] allude to
UNHCR's supervisory role under Article 35 of the 1951 Convention in discussing
evaluation of changed conditions, but they do not clearly state what is to happen when
the asylum state's assessment diverges from UNHCR's." Fitzpatrick, supra note 25, at
para. 48; see also supra note 117.
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